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Respondent-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a denial of a petition for 
postconviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1990), as the appeal is from an order 
on a petition for postconviction relief challenging a conviction 
of less than a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the habeas court properly determine that 
petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel at 
trial by counsel's failure to move the court for a reduction of 
the crime charged from burglary to criminal trespass? On appeal 
from the denial of postconviction relief, "we survey the record 
in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we 
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to 
support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ 
should be granted." Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658-59 (Utah 
1989). 
2. Did the habeas court properly find that petitioner 
did not timely inform his trial counsel about the relationship of 
Juror Lucero to himself, and did the habeas court properly find 
that petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of 
counsel on that basis? The same standard as given in the first 
issue applies to this issue as well. 
3. Does this point raise any issue which is not 
addressed in the first two points of the brief? If any new issue 
is raised in this point, petitioner has failed to provide legal 
analysis to support the new claim. This Court should decline to 
address any issues for which legal analysis has not been 
provided. State v. Amicone# 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of 
burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a class B 
misdemeanor. He appealed his conviction, alleging that the 
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the 
pretrial identification procedures were so suggestive that his 
due process rights were violated, and that he was prejudiced by 
the admission into evidence of a photo array and by the admission 
for impeachment purposes of petitioner's prior conviction. This 
Court affirmed petitioner's conviction. See State v. Pacheco, 
778 P.2d 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (A copy of the decision is 
attached as Addendum A). 
On July 20, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for 
postconviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court, 
before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup (Record [hereafter R.] at 2-
41). Pro bono counsel was appointed for petitioner on August 17, 
1989 and an evidentiary hearing was held on November 29, 1989 (R. 
at 128). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the 
petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are contained in the 
statement of the case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The habeas court properly found that petitioner was not 
denied effective assistance of counsel at trial by counsel's 
failure to move the court for a reduction of the crime charged 
from burglary to criminal trespass. 
Petitioner did not timely inform his trial counsel 
about the relationship of Juror Lucero to himself and, therefore, 
the habeas court properly found that petitioner was not denied 
the effective assistance of counsel. 
Petitioner does not raise any issues in point III of 
his brief which were not raised in points I and II. If any of 
the material in point III could be construed as raising a 
separate issue, this Court should to address the issue because 
petitioner has not provided legal analysis for any new claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HABEAS COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL BY COUNSEL'S 
FAILURE TO MOVE THE COURT FOR A REDUCTION IN 
THE CRIME CHARGED FROM BURGLARY TO CRIMINAL 
TRESPASS• 
In his petition for postconviction relief, petitioner 
claimed, inter alia, that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance because counsel failed to move for reduction of the 
burglary charge to one of criminal trespass. This argument 
appears to be based on an argument that burglary and trespass are 
the same crime and petitioner is entitled to conviction for the 
lesser offense. A second argument appears to be that the crimes 
are different but that there was no evidence of theft, so 
petitioner should have been convicted of trespass rather than 
burglary. 
In Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that on appeal from denial of habeas corpus 
relief, "we survey the record in the light most favorable to the 
findings and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a 
reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to 
be convinced that the writ should be granted." Id. at 658-59. 
In order to prevail on his claim that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance, petitioner must meet the 
standard delineated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In that case, the 
Court said: 
.d. 
Firstf the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. • . . Second/ the 
defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. 
[A] court must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance; 
that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances/ 
the challenged action "might be considered 
sound trial strategy." 
Strickland/ 466 U.S. at 687/ 689 (citations omitted). The Utah 
Supreme Court has expounded on this standard in several cases. 
In Codianna v. Morrisf 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983)/ the court said: 
The burden of establishing inadequate 
representation is on the defendant, "and 
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter." . . . A 
lawyer's "legitimate exercise of judgment" in 
the choice of trial strategy or tactics that 
did not produce the anticipated result does 
not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel. . . . It must appear that any 
deficiency in the performance of counsel was 
prejudicial. 
Id. at 1109 (citations omitted). See also State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401/ 405 (Utah 1986). 
Petitioner has the burden to show that counsel's 
performance was deficient and that that deficiency prejudiced the 
defendant. Defendant has not met this burden. For this reason, 
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected by 
the habeas court and should be rejected by this Court. Judge 
Rigtrup properly found that "petitioner has not demonstrated a 
substantial denial of his constitutional rights." Judge Rigtrup 
further found that "petitioner has not demonstrated that his 
criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance" and that 
"the Court must consider the conduct of trial counsel very 
carefully, with the presumption that trial counsel acted 
correctly unless petitioner demonstrates actual prejudice to 
himself from counsel's conduct" (R. at 133; a copy of the court's 
findings and conclusions are attached as Addendum B). 
Defendant is required to show that, absent the trial 
errors, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable 
result. The mere fact that a defendant receives an unfavorable 
result does not give rise to the conclusion that his trial 
counsel's performance was deficient. See State v. Montes, 151 
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hoyt, 153 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Velarde, 154 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Petitioner first maintains that counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to move for reduction of the 
burglary charge to a charge of criminal trespass. Petitioner 
argues that there is overlap between the two crimes and that Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-1 (1990) mandates that he be convicted of the 
lower degree. That provisions readsz 
When it appears the defendant has 
committed a public offense and there is 
reasonable doubt as to which of two or more 
degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted 
only of the lower degree. 
The statute applies only if there is a reasonable doubt as to 
which degree petitioner was guilty of. In the case of the 
overlapping charges of criminal trespass and burglary, there are 
two elements which, if proven, make a person guilty of the 
greater offense. If a person enters or remains unlawfully in a 
- f i -
building (as opposed to "on property") and with the intent to 
commit a felony or theft or an assault, the person is guilty of 
burglary, not criminal trespass. In petitioner's case, there was 
no reasonable doubt that he entered a building (the victims's 
house) and that he did it with the intent to commit a theft. 
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of burglary and theft. 
Pacheco, 778 P.2d at 28. This Court affirmed that conviction, 
finding, inter alia, that there was sufficient evidence to 
support petitioner's conviction for theft. Id. at 27. Since the 
jury and this court have determined that petitioner committed 
theft while burglarizing the victims's home, there is no 
reasonable doubt as to which crime or degree of conviction 
petitioner is guilty. Consequently, petitioner's claim that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to move for reduction of the 
charge must fail. 
At the evidentiary hearing on his petition, petitioner 
focused on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective because 
counsel did not challenge the evidence that money had been taken. 
In denying petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to challenge the evidence, Judge Rigtrup held: 
3. That it was an exercise of judgment 
for petitioner's criminal trial counsel to 
decide not to challenge the issue of whether 
money was actually taken during the burglary. 
4. That petitioner's criminal trial 
counsel properly sought to avoid the 
appearance of taking inconsistent positions 
when he chose to not challenge the theft 
issue. 
5. That petitioner's theory of the 
criminal case was that petitioner was not 
present at the victims' house during the 
burglary and theft and that petitioner's 
criminal trial counsel followed that theory. 
Counsel could have probed the theft issue 
further but did not provide ineffective 
assistance when he did not do so. 
(R. at 132; Addendum B). 
Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective 
because counsel did not pursue a trial strategy which called for 
requesting a motion to reduce the charge from burglary to 
criminal trespass. As cited above, an attorney's exercise of 
judgment in choice of trial strategy is not grounds for a claim 
of ineffective assistance if the strategy does not achieve the 
anticipated result. See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109. At 
petitioner's criminal trial, his defense was that he was not the 
person seen in, or leaving, the victim's home. He presented 
evidence that he had loaned his car to his estranged son the day 
of the crime, and he maintained that he was not the individual at 
the home. The issue was one of identification, not one of 
whether a theft occurred. Pacheco, 778 P.2d at 28. Based on 
defendant's representations to his counsel that he was not at the 
victims's home on that day, counsel pursued the trial strategy of 
attacking the eyewitnesses' identifications of petitioner. To 
have followed the course petitioner now urges would have put 
counsel in the untenable position of arguing to the jury that 
petitioner was not guilty because he was not here; but, if he was 
there, he did not take anything. Counsel appropriately followed 
a single theory of the case which afforded petitioner his best 
chance of acquittal. The habeas court determined that that 
strategy was appropriate and that petitioner had not demonstrated 
that trial counsel had provided ineffective counsel. There is 
nothing in the record of petitioner's postconviction proceeding 
which overcomes the deference to the habeas court's findings and 
judgment established by Medina v, Cookf 779 P.2d 658, 658-59 
(Utah 1989). 
POINT II 
THE HABEAS COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
PETITIONER DID NOT TIMELY ADVISE HIS TRIAL 
COUNSEL ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR 
LUCERO TO HIMSELF AND, THEREFORE, PETITIONER 
WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
Petitioner next claims that his counsel was ineffective 
because counsel did not challenge a juror named Michael Lucero 
who, petitioner maintains, was related to petitioner and may have 
had ill will toward petitioner. Petitioner claimed in his 
petition for postconviction relief that Lucero falsely denied 
being related and that counsel was aware of that falsity. 
Petitioner did not support this claim at the evidentiary hearing 
and the habeas court determined that petitioner had not met his 
burden that counsel was ineffective on this issue (R. at 134; 
Addendum B). 
In the findings of fact and conclusions of law signed 
by Judge Rigtrup after the evidentiary hearing, the court found 
that "the jury had been selected and the first day of 
petitioner's criminal trial commenced when petitioner raised the 
issue of a possible conflict with one of the jurors" (R. at 133; 
Addendum B). In State v. Harrison, 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah 
Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1991), this Court held that a challenge to an 
individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn, 
except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after 
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. 
The habeas court's determination that petitioner had raised this 
issue in an untimely fashion is based on petitioner's own 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing (R. at 148-56; a copy of the 
transcript pages is attached as Addendum C). Petitioner himself 
had not known of the relationship or recognized the juror when 
the jury was being selected (R. at 150; Addendum C). It was 
petitioner's mother who heard the name and asked petitioner to 
describe the juror who told petitioner that the juror was 
petitioner's sister's brother-in-law (R. at 150; Addendum C). On 
the stand, petitioner admitted that Lucero may have been just as 
ignorant of a possible relationship as he himself; in other 
words, that Lucero was not lying when he claimed no relationship 
to petitioner (R. at 153; Addendum C). 
Judge Rigtrup further held that "the record is scant on 
the inability of the juror of which petitioner complains to act 
impartially in petitioner's trial. Petitioner merely supposes 
that the juror would not have acted impartially because of an 
alleged conflict between the juror and petitioner's father" (R. 
at 133; Addendum B). This failure to meet his burden of showing 
bias on the part of Lucero also defeats petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance. Petitioner's mother submitted an 
affidavit that Lucero was petitioner's sister's brother-in-law 
(R. at 79-80; Addendum D). There was no direct evidence 
presented that Lucero was biased at petitioner's trial; 
petitioner only testified that he understood that there were hard 
feelings between Lucero and petitioner's father (R. at 152; 
Addendum C). The court concluded that this testimony was not 
sufficient to prove that the juror had any bias (R. at 134; 
Addendum B). The record of this proceeding contains ,f'a 
reasonable basis . . . to support the trial court's refusal to be 
convinced that the writ should [have been] granted.'" Medina v. 
Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658-59 (Utah 1989) (quoting Bundy v. DeLand, 
763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)) (quoting Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 
Utah 2d, 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Utah 1967)). The habeas 
court properly concluded that petitioner had not established that 
he received ineffective assistance at trial and properly denied 
the petition for postconviction relief. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE THIS POINT APPEARS TO BE A 
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE FIRST 
TWO POINTS OF PETITIONER'S BRIEF, IT IS NOT 
NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUE A SECOND 
TIME. 
It is unclear what petitioner appears to be claiming in 
point III of his brief. He appears to be claiming that he did 
not receive a fair trial because he lacked the intent to commit 
burglary and because juror Lucero lied about his relationship to 
petitioner. These issues were addressed, and shown to be without 
error, in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel in the 
first two points of this brief. The effective assistance of 
counsel is an issue of a constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 ("The purpose of the inquiry is simply to 
insure that defendant receives a fair trial"). Petitioner has 
not provided analysis of a fairness claim in any other context; 
consequently, this Court should decline to address the fairness 
-11-
issue in any other context. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support this 
argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule 
on it"). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the denial of petitioner's petition for 
postconviction relief. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this «^0~" day of March, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
\J>S !tO 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Robert Paul Pacheco, petitioner pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, 
Utah 84020, this pJ& day of March, 1991. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
26 Utah 778 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
• . 
Robert Paul PACHECO, Defendant 
and Appellant 
Case No. 880281-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 8, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David S. 
Young, J., of burglary and theft, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Green-
wood, J., held that: (1) pretrial identifica-
tion procedure was not impermissibly sug-
gestive, and (2) evidence was sufficient to 
support convictions. 
Affirmed. 
1. Constitutional Law <s=>266(3.4) 
To determine if preindictment or prein-
formation photo spread is so suggestive 
that subsequent in-court identification vio-
lates due process, two-part test is applied: 
first, pretrial photographic identification 
procedure must be so impermissibly sug-
gestive as to give rise to very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification; 
second, if photo array is impermissibly sug-
gestive, in-court identification must be 
based on untainted, independent foundation 
to be reliable. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 
14. 
2. Constitutional haw &*266(B) 
In reviewing whether defendant's due 
process rights were violated because of 
likelihood of misidentification, each case 
must be considered under totality of the 
circumstances; if identification procedure 
gives rise to requisite likelihood of irrepa-
rable misidentification, defendant's right to 
due process is violated. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amends. 5, 14. 
3. Criminal Law <s»339.10(2, 6) 
In evaluating likelihood of in-court mis-
identification after witness views allegedly 
suggestive photo spread, factors to be con-
sidered include: opportunity of witness to 
view criminal at time of crime, witness* 
degree of attention, accuracy of witness* 
prior description, level of certainty demon-
strated by witness at time of confrontation, 
and length of time between crime and con-
frontation. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
4. Criminal Law <s=»339.7(3, 4) 
Pretrial identification procedure in 
which witness was shown two sets of photo 
arrays was not impermissibly suggestive, 
although witness was told she had identi-
fied the suspect when she tentatively iden-
tified defendant after viewing first array, 
and was then shown second array in which 
defendant was the only repeated person. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
5. Criminal Law <s=>339.10(11) 
Witness* in-court identification of de-
fendant was sufficiently independent of her 
identification of defendant through alleg-
edly suggestive photographic array to be 
admissible in burglary prosecution; wit-
ness positively identified defendant at trial, 
correctly recited his license plate number 
and identified clothes found in his home as 
looking like those worn by person she saw 
running from victim's house. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
6. Criminal Law <3»1045 
Where there is no indication on record 
on appeal that trial court reached or ruled 
on issue, Court of Appeals will not consider 
issue on appeal. 
7. Criminal Law <3=»1045 
Issue of whether trial court erred in 
denying defendant's pretrial motion to sup-
press evidence of prior conviction for at-
tempted robbery would not be considered 
on appeal from defendant's burglary con-
viction, where defendant did not obtain oral 
or written ruling on motion on the record. 
8. Criminal Law <3=>899 
Any error in admitting set of six pho-
tos that were used by witness to identify 
defendant and appeared to be booking pho-
tos was waived by defendant when defen-
dant subsequently testified as to his prior 
conviction, even if photographs arguably 
suggest* 
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9. Burg 
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suggested prior criminal record. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-35-30(a). 
9. Burglary <s»41(6) 
Larceny e=>55 
Positive identification of defendant by 
witness who observed defendant as he ran 
from victim's house was sufficient to sup-
port defendant's convictions for theft and 
burglary. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202, 76-6-404. 
James A. Valdez, Richard G. Uday, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Barbara Bearnson, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent 
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Robert Paul Pacheco appeals from his 
jury conviction of burglary, a second de-
gree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978) and theft, a class B mis-
demeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404 (1978). On appeal, Pacheco 
claims that identification procedures used 
violated his due process rights, that the 
trial court erred in admitting evidence of a 
prior conviction, that the trial court errone-
ously admitted into evidence an exhibit con-
sisting of mug shots, and that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the convictions. 
We affirm. 
The facts in this case are largely undis-
puted. On April 7, 1987, at about 3:30 
p.m., Ray and Katherine Welch were work-
ing in their backyard. Mr. Welch took a 
break, went in the back door of his house 
and saw a man in the kitchen. The man 
ran out the front door and down the street, 
jumped into a blue and white car, and 
drove away. Mr. Welch later noticed that 
between $4 and $50 was missing from his 
wallet. Mr. Welch could not identify Pa-
checo as the man he saw run from his 
home that day. Mrs. Welch was outside, 
heard her husband yell and saw the man 
run to his car. A neighbor, Connie Luna, 
Utah Rep. 776-779 P.2d—13 
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testified that when she heard Mr. Welch 
yell, she came out of her house. She saw a 
male running from across the street to a 
car parked near her driveway. Realizing 
something was amiss, she ran across the 
yard to get a better look. Mrs. Luna was 
within about twenty feet of the man and 
was able to look at him full face before he 
entered the car and drove away. She ob-
served that he wore a red checkered shirt 
and beige pants. In addition, she obtained 
the license plate number of the blue and 
white car the man drove. 
Detective Paul LaMont ran a check on 
the license plate number Mrs. Luna provid-
ed, and determined that Pacheco was the 
registered owner of the car. Detective La-
Mont went to Pacheco's house with a 
search warrant and removed several shirts 
and pants. A few days after the incident, 
Detective LaMont showed Mrs. Luna a pho-
to spread consisting of black and white 
driver's license photos, including Pacheco's. 
Mrs. Luna identified Pacheco as the man 
who ran from the Welchs' house, but stat-
ed she was not positive. Detective LaMont 
told her she had identified the suspect. 
About two weeks later, Detective LaMont 
showed Mrs. Luna a photo spread contain-
ing color photos. The folder containing the 
photos was marked " 'Mug' Show-Up Fold-
er." The lower portion of each picture 
contained a black placard with the words 
"Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office" and a 
police identification number. Mrs. Luna 
identified Pacheco from the photo spread 
as the man she saw on the day in question. 
During the trial, Mrs. Luna identified a 
shirt and a pair of pants seized from Pache-
co's home as looking like the clothes worn 
by the perpetrator. She also recited, from 
memory, Pacheco's license plate number as 
the one on the car the perpetrator drove on 
the day in question. Mrs. Luna admitted 
that when she looked at the first photo 
spread she was not positive that she had 
identified the person she saw on that day. 
She also stated that Pacheco was the only 
person appearing in both photo spreads. 
Mrs. Luna identified Pacheco at trial and 
stated that she was positive that he was 
the man she saw on the day in question. 
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At trial, before Pacheco testified, the 
State offered the second group of photo-
graphs labeled "'Mug' Show-Up Folder" 
into evidence. Pacheco's attorney objected 
to the photos on the basis that they ap-
peared to be booking photos and were sug-
gestive and highly prejudicial. The court 
overruled the objection and permitted the 
photographs to be shown to the jury. 
Pacheco took the stand and testified that 
he did not commit the burglary and theft. 
He claimed that he had loaned his car to his 
son on that day, who returned the car 
about 5 p.m. Pacheco made no attempt to 
locate his son prior to trial and did not 
inquire about his son's whereabouts on that 
day. The jury found Pacheco guilty of 
burglary and theft. This appeal followed. 
I. Identification Procedures 
On appeal Pacheco claims that the identi-
fication procedures were unduly sugges-
tive. Specifically, Pacheco claims that the 
police improperly affirmed Mrs. Luna's 
first, uncertain identification of him by tell-
ing her that she had identified the suspect. 
They then returned a couple of weeks later 
with another photospread which was la-
beled "'Mug' Show-Up Folder" and in 
which Pacheco was the only repeated per-
son. That identification procedure, Pache-
co claims, violated his due process rights 
and constitutes reversible error. 
[1,2] Showing crime witnesses a num-
ber of pictures and asking if they can iden-
tify a perpetrator is an identification meth-
od which has long been used to identify 
those suspected of committing crimes. 
State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 
1349, 1352 (1972). Resolving questions 
about admissibility of identification evi-
dence hinges on assessing reliability of the 
evidence. State v. Thamer, 111 P.2d 432, 
(1989). In order to promote evidentiary 
reliability, law enforcement officials should 
conduct identification processes in an im-
partial, disinterested manner. Id To de-
termine if a pre-indictment or pre-informa-
tion photo spread is so suggestive that the 
subsequent in-court identification violates 
due process, we apply a two-part test. 
First, the pretrial photographic identifica-
tion procedure must be so impermissibly 
suggestive as to "give rise to a very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidenti-
fication." Id. Second, if the photo array is 
impermissibly suggestive, "the in-court 
identification must be based on an untaint-
ed, independent foundation to be reliable." 
Id; see also Perry, 492 P.2d at 1352. This 
standard applies not only to in-court identi-
fication, but also to determine the admissi-
bility of testimony concerning out-of-court 
identifications. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 
188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 381, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 
(1972). A prior identification of a suspect 
may offset implications of suggestiveness 
in a subsequent identification. See Tham-
er, 111 P.2d at 435. In reviewing whether 
a defendant's due process rights were vio-
lated because of the likelihood of misidenti-
fication, each case must be considered un-
der the totality of the circumstances. Id 
If the identification procedure gives rise to 
the requisite likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification, defendant's right to due pro-
cess is violated. Neil, 409 U.S. at 198, 93 
S.Ct. at 381 (1972). 
[3] In evaluating the likelihood of in-
court misidentification, the factors to be 
considered include: the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time of 
the crime, the witness's degree of atten-
tion, the accuracy of the witness's prior 
description, the level of certainty demon-
strated by the witness at the time of the 
confrontation, and the length of time be-
tween the crime and the confrontation. 
Thamer, at 436; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 
S.Ct. at 382. 
[4] We first examine the pre-trial identi-
fication by Mrs. Luna, to determine if it 
was impermissibly suggestive. Several 
days after the crime occurred, Detective 
LaMont showed Mrs. Luna a group of 
black and white photographs. At that time 
Mrs. Luna stated she could not make a 
positive identification but she pointed out 
Pacheco and stated that he looked like the 
man. Detective LaMont then told her she 
had identified the suspect. A week or two 
later, Detective LaMont returned with a 
group of color photographs labeled " 'Mug' 
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Show-Up Folder." Mrs. Luna identified 
Pacheco as the man she saw on the day in 
question. According to Mrs. Luna's testi-
mony, Pacheco was the only person re-
peated in both photo spreads. Mrs. Luna's 
identification became positive when she 
saw the second group of photographs. 
While there may be better ways to provide 
photographs than utilized in the second 
group of "mug-type shots," and it would be 
preferable if the officer had not named 
Pacheco as the suspect after the first inci-
dent, these acts are not egregious enough 
to taint Mrs. Luna's second positive identi-
fication. The second photographs simply 
allowed Mrs. Luna to clarify her prior iden-
tification. 
[5] In addition, we find that the in-court 
identification by Mrs. Luna was based on 
independent factors. Mrs. Luna positively 
identified Pacheco at trial, correctly recited 
his license plate number and identified 
clothes found in his home as looking like 
those worn by the person she saw running 
from the Welchs' house. Under the totali-
ty of the circumstances, we hold that the 
photographic identification procedure used 
was not so impermissibly suggestive as to 
give rise to a substantial likelihood of irrep-
arable misidentification and that the in-
court identification was independently reli-
able. Thus, Pacheco's due process rights 
were not violated by the identification pro-
cesses. 
II. Motion in Limine 
[6,7] Pacheco's second claim on appeal 
is that the trial court erred in denying his 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence of a 
prior conviction for attempted robbery. 
Pacheco filed a motion in limine prior to 
trial. However, Pacheco did not obtain an 
oral or written ruling on the motion on the 
record. Where there is no indication in the 
record on appeal that the trial court 
reached or ruled on an issue, this court will 
not consider the issue on appeal. Cun-
ningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 
552 n. 2 (Utah 1984). Thus, because the 
record contains no indication that the trial 
court ruled on the motion, or how, we de-
cline to consider the issue. 
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III. Admissibility of "Mug Shots" 
[8] Pacheco also claims that the court 
erred in allowing the photographs labeled 
as a " 'Mug' Show-Up Folder" to be pub-
lished to the jury. The photo spread con-
tained pictures of six individuals. The bot-
tom portion of each photo contains a black 
placard with the words "Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office" and a police identification 
number. The photographs were admitted 
into evidence during the State's case in 
chief, prior to Pacheco's testimony and ad-
mission that he had previously been con-
victed of a crime. When the photographs 
were offered into evidence, Pacheco's attor-
ney noted, in the presence of the jury, that 
the folder contained paper clips and asked 
the court to instruct the jury not to "mess 
with" the paper clips. At the end of the 
State's case, Pacheco's attorney objected to 
publishing the exhibit to the jury. He ar-
gued that the photos appeared to be book-
ing photos, and were highly prejudicial to 
Pacheco in that Pacheco had not yet been 
placed on the stand and to testify regard-
ing his prior record. In his opening state-
ment, Pacheco's attorney indicated Pacheco 
would testify in his own defense. Move-
ment of the paper clips reveals that each 
individual has two connected photos: a pro-
file and a full face photograph. 
Generally, the trial court's rulings on 
evidentiary matters will not be disturbed 
absent a showing "that the court so abused 
its discretion that there is a likelihood that 
injustice resulted." State v. McClain, 706 
P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985). 
Admissibility of mug shots has not yet 
been fully addressed by the Utah appellate 
courts. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 
942, 945-47 (Utah 1982); State v. Owens, 
15 Utah 2d 123, 388 P.2d 797, 798 (1964). 
Several courts, however, have adopted the 
following three part test to determine 
whether or not the introduction of mug 
shots constitutes reversible error 
1. The Government must have a demon-
strable need to introduce the photo-
graphs; and 
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2. The photographs themselves, if 
shown to the jury, must not imply that 
the defendant has a prior criminal record; 
and 
3. The manner of introduction at trial 
must be such that it does not draw par-
ticular attention to the source or implica-
tions of the photographs. 
United States v. Torres-Flores, 827 F.2d 
1031,1038-39 (5th Cir.1987); United States 
v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st Cir.1978); 
United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 
494 (2nd Cir.1973); State v. Kutzen, 1 Ha-
waii App. 406, 620 P.2d 258 (1980). 
The admission of improper photographs 
has been held to not constitute reversible 
error where defendants opened the door 
for admission. United States v. Guinn, 
454 F.2d 29, 37 (5th Cir.1972) cert denied 
407 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 2437, 32 L.Ed.2d 685. 
See generally Annotation, Admissibility, 
and Prejudicial Effect of Admission, of 
"Mug Shot," "Rogues' Gallery11 Photo-
graph, or Photograph Taken in Prison, of 
Defendant in Criminal Trial, 30 A.L.R.3d 
908 (1970). Also, in United States v. 
Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 121 (5th Cir.1973), 
cert den. 415 U.S. 981, 94 S.Ct. 1573, 39 
L.Ed.2d 878 (1974), the court determined 
that where defendant took the stand after 
a mug-type photograph had been exhibited 
to the jury, and testified as to his prior 
felony conviction, the trial court's error, if 
any, was cured or waived by defendant's 
testimony. The court noted that "[refer-
ence to or use by a defendant of an errone-
ously admitted line of evidence ordinarily 
cures or waives error." Id. The Davis 
court relied on United States v. Silvers, 
374 F.2d 828, 831-32 (7th Cir.1967) where 
the court held that defendant waived his 
objection to the admissibility of evidence 
regarding his prior convictions and incar-
cerations, by himself presenting evidence 
of the prior convictions to assist in his 
defense. In Silvers, the court held that 
references to defendant's prior convictions 
during the State's case was vitiated by 
defendant's extensive use of his prior crimi-
nal record, and thus did not constitute prej-
udicial error. Id. at 832. 
We are convinced that any error in this 
case in admitting the photographs was 
waived by Pacheco, as in Silvers, when 
Pacheco testified as to his prior conviction. 
The photographs arguably may suggest a 
prior criminal record, but Pacheco, by his 
own testimony, resolved any doubts the 
jury may have had when he disclosed his 
earlier conviction for attempted robbery. 
The error, therefore, if any, was harmless 
and does not justify reversal. See Utah 
R.Crim.P. 30(a); State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 1071, 1072-73 (Utah 1989). 
IV. Sufficiency of Evidence 
[9] Finally, we consider Pacheco's con-
tention that the evidence is insufficient to 
support his conviction. In examining a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
after a jury verdict, 
we review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury convic-
tion for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Accordingly, we 
have reviewed the evidence from the record 
and all the inferences which may be drawn 
from the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the jury's verdict. 
Mr. and Mrs. Welch were in their back-
yard when the burglary occurred. A man 
matching Pacheco's description was seen 
on the Welchs' porch by neighbors. Mr. 
Welch surprised Pacheco when he entered 
the house, and Pacheco ran out of the 
house, got in his car and drove away. Mr. 
Welch yelled at Pacheco as he ran. A 
neighbor, Mrs. Luna, saw Pacheco as he 
fled, from only about twenty feet away, 
and positively identified him both before 
and at trial. She also observed the cloth-
r
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ing he wore, which was similar to clothing 
seized from Pacheco's house, and noted the 
license plate number of the car Pacheco 
drove. The car was registered to Pacheco. 
We conclude that the evidence is not so 
inconclusive or improbable that reasonable 
minds would reasonably doubt Pacheco 
committed the crimes of theft and burglary 
and therefore, that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's conviction. 
Affirmed. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO, : 
Petitioner, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
M. ELDON BARNES, Warden t Case No. 890904474 HC 
Utah State Prison, 
: Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Respondent. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on November 29, 1989, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Judge. Petitioner, 
Robert Paul Pacheco, was present with counsel, Clayton J. Parr 
and Dan H. Matthews. Respondent was represented by Charlene 
Barlow, Assistant Attorney General. The Court being fully 
advised in the premises hereby enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
n 
12? 
HUB WST*"?? *:'.»*? 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 5 1989 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
00*31 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That petitioner is currently incarcerated in the 
Utah State Prison. 
2. That the extent and scope of discovery in criminal 
cases differs from that of civil cases; contact by petitioner's 
criminal trial counsel with opposing witnesses is limited. 
3. That it was an exercise of judgment for 
petitioner's criminal trial counsel to decide not to challenge 
the issue of whether money was actually taken during the 
burglary. 
4. That petitioner's criminal trial counsel properly 
sought to avoid the appearance of taking inconsistent positions 
when he chose to not challenge the theft issue. 
5. That petitioner's theory of the criminal case was 
that petitioner was not present at the victims' house during the 
burglary and theft and that petitioner's criminal trial counsel 
followed that theory. Counsel could have probed the theft issue 
further but did not provide ineffective assistance when he did 
not do so. 
6. That there has been no evidence presented by 
petitioner which demonstrates that the jury process used in his 
trial was flawed, or even what the make up of the prospective 
panel was. 
-2- C0i32 
7. That the jury had been selected and the first day 
of petitioner's criminal trial commenced when petitioner raised 
the issue of a possible conflict with one of the jurors. 
8. That the record is scant on the inability of the 
juror of which petitioner complains to act impartially in 
petitioner's trial. Petitioner merely supposes that the juror 
would not have acted impartially because of an alleged conflict 
between the juror and petitioner's father. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That petitioner has not demonstrated a substantial 
denial of his constitutional rights. 
2. That petitioner has the burden of production and of 
proof in establishing his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
3. That the Court must consider the conduct of trial 
counsel very carefully, with the presumption that trial counsel 
acted correctly unless petitioner demonstrates actual prejudice 
to himself from counsel's conduct. 
4. That petitioner has not demonstrated that his 
criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 
5. That petitioner has the burden to prove that the 
process used to select the jury in his criminal case 
systematically excluded a cognizable minority group. 
6. That petitioner has failed to sustain this burden. 
-3- 00*33 
1. That petitioner's failure to meet this burden also 
demonstrates a failure to prove that his criminal trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by not raising a challenge to the 
jury selection process. 
8. That petitioner has not met his burden of showing 
any bias on the part of the juror of whom he complains. 
9. That petitioner's failure to meet this burden also 
demonstrates a failure to prove that his criminal trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by not challenging the juror. 
DATED this /5*—"flay of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
T&— STH RIGTRUP 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Clayton J. Parr and Dan H. Matthews, Kimball, 
Parr, Crockett & Waddoups, Attorneys for petitioner, 185 South 
State Street, Suite 1300, P.O. Box 11019, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84147, this H > ^ of December, 1989. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U %y o ° R J T S ! G T G e t l R + 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH™* Judicia,District 
* * * 
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
N. ELDON BARNES, 
Defend a n t s . 
M 
MAR 2 3 1990 
CtoputyCitt 
CIV 890904474 HC 
Court's Allowed Transcript 
11-29-89 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 29th day of 
November, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., this cause ca*e 
on for Hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
trict Court, without a jury, in the Salt Lake 
Dis< 
Co unty Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: CLAYTON PARR 
DAN MATHEWS 
Attorneys at Law 
For the Defendant: CHARLENE BARLOW 
Attorney at Law 
CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
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MR. PARR: I would like to call 
Mr. Pacheco to the stand for a few brief questions, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may. 
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO. called 
as a witness on his own behalf, after having been duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARR: 
Q. Just for record, would you please state 
your full name? 
A. Robert Paul Pacheco. 
Q. 
A. 
Where are you currently residing? 
Utah State Prison. 
Q. Mr. Pacheco, when were you committed to 
the Utah State Prison? 
A. April 22nd, 1988. 
Q. Were you present during the phase of 
your trial when prospective jurors were questioned by 
the Judge and by the two attorneys? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Were the prospective members of the jury 
asked by the Court, or either of the attorneys 
present, whether they were related to you or knew you 
2 PACHECO Wit P d 
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during this questioning? 
A. Yes# they were, 
Q. Did any of the jury members who were 
eventually chosen to serve on the jury answer that 
they did know you or were related to you? 
A. No. 
MR. PARR: Your Honor, may I approach 
the witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. PARR: I'm giving him here what's 
been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 1. All this 
is# Your Honor, is the transcript — well, it is the 
front page of the transcript from his trial. And I've 
omitted the second page and gone on to the third 
page. At the bottom of the third page# we have a list 
of the jurors that were seated in Mr. Pacheco's case. 
Mr. Pacheco, would you please look on 
the second page of what I've handed you at the bottom, 
And tell me: Are you related in any way to any 
members of the jury that sat in your case? 
A. Yes. 
Q* To which member of the jury listed here 
are you related? 
A. Michael Lucero. 
Q. What is that relationship? 
3 PACHECO Wit P d 
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A. Michael Lucero is my sister's 
brother-in-law. 
Q. Okay. Mr. Pacheco, did you recognize 
Mr. Lucero when he was being questioned as a potential 
juror? 
A. Nof sir. 
Q. Were you aware at that time that you 
were related to Mr. Lucero? 
A. No. 
Q. So, when did you discover that 
relat ionship? 
A. I discovered it the night after the jury 
was selected . 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And how did that take place? 
My mother told me. 
And was your mother there at the time? 
A. No. At the time -- after the jury 
selection took place, I went home. I explained to her 
what the proceedings were at the court. And I told 
her that there was one Hispanic that was chosen for 
the jury. And she asked who it was. And I mentioned 
Michael Lucero. She asked me to describe him. I did 
so. She told me that was my sister's brother-in-law. 
Q. Did you inform Mr. Valdez of this 
relationship? 
PACHECO Wit P d 
A, Yes, I did. 
Q» Now, given the fact that the 
relationship is quite distant, were you concerned 
about his presence on the jury? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why is that? 
A* There was -- I talked with my mother 
about it, and she had told me that --
MS. BARLOW: Objection to hearsay, Your 
Honor, if his mother is not here to testify. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. PARR: Your Honor, I -- his mother 
is here to testify, and we can call her to the stand, 
if we want. I believe he can testify as to why he was 
concerned about the relationship. I understand he 
can't testify as to what his mother told him, but he 
can testify, I believe, as to why he was concerned 
about Mr. Lucero on the jury. 
Just please limit your questions --
THE COURT: Overruled. I'll assume that 
it's not for the truth of the matter asserted. You 
may proceed. 
MR. PARR: Once again, the question is: 
Why were you concerned -- given the fact that the 
relationship was quite distant, why were you 
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1 J concerned? 
2 1 A. My understanding was there was hard 
3 J feelings between my father and Mr. Lucero. 
4 1 Q. Okay. Did you inform Mr. Valdez of your 
5 1 concerns, that your father and Mr. Lucero had hard 
6 J feelings? 
7 A. Yes, I did. 
81 Q. To the best of your knowledge, did 
9 1 Mr. Valdez ever attempt to have Mr. Lucero removed as 
10 J a juror? 
11 A. No. 
12 1 Q. To the best of your knowledge, did 
13 J Mr. Valdez ever bring the existence of this 
14 1 relationship, and the possible bias, to the attention 
15 of the Judge? 
16 A. No, he didn ft. 
17 1 Q. Did Mr. Valdez ever ask you to look into 
18 1 the matter further and let him know? 
19 A. No. 
20 MR. PARR: That's all the questions I 
211 have, Your Honor. 
22 1 THE COURT: You may cross. 
23 1 MS. BARLOW: Thank you. Your Honor. 
24 
25 
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BY MS. BARLOW: 
Q. Mr. Pacheco, what exactly did you tell 
Mr. Valdez about this relationship with Mr. Lucero? 
A. That he was my sister's brother-in-law. 
Q. Did you tell him anything else? 
A. Well, I mentioned that my understanding 
was that a defendant could not have a relation on the 
jury. 
Q. 
likes me"? 
A. 
Q. 
you? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Did you s a y , "I d o n ' t t h i n k t h i s guy 
No, I d i d n ' t know him. 
You d i d n ' t know h im. Did Lucero know 
No. 
Did he know of the relationship? 
I have no idea. 
Q. He might have been just as in the dark 
about the relationship as you, is that correct? 
A. He may have, yes. 
Q. He might not have been lying when he 
said, "No, I'm not related." He might not have been 
aware of the relationship? 
A. At the time that he was sworn in? 
Q. Yes. 
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A. Yes, that could be. 
Q. So, your concern is not so much that he 
lied when he said he wasn't related. Your concern is 
that, after you found out about the relationship, you 
think Valdez should have done something about it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's your concern. 
Isn't it true that you told Mr. Valdez 
he might be related to you? 
A. No. 
Q. And Mr. Valdez told you, "Well, find out 
for sure before we go any further"? 
A. No. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
You don't recall that conversation? 
It had never taken place. 
You are assuming that the hard feelings 
between your father and Mr. Lucero would carry over to 
his feelings about you, is that correct? 
A. I was concerned about that, yes. 
Q. You are concerned about that, even 
though he may have not even have known about the 
relationship? 
A. At the time that -- excuse me. At the 
time that he took the jury out, I believe he didn't 
know me. But, after he had seen my mother testify, I 
8 PACHECO WIT P X 
believe, then, he knew who we were. 
Q. And you are making that assumption? I 
mean, you didn't talk to him directly and say, "Did 
you recognize my mother?" 
A. No, ma'am. That would be tampering with 
the jury. 
Q. My simple question, yes or no answer: 
No, you didn't talk to him? 
A. No. 
MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, pending 
Mr. Valdez being here to question him, I have no 
further questions. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. PARR: Just one brief question. 
Now, you just mentioned, I believe, that 
at the time of being sworn in, Mr. Lucero may have not 
been aware of the relationship. But, you believe that 
he became aware of that later on, is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. PARR: And that is why you were 
concerned that his hard feelings you said about your 
father might carry over? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. PARR: I have no further questions. 
9 PACHECO WIT P X 
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THE COURT: You may step down. 
(Court allowed transcript completed.) 
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ss 
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Public in and for the State of Utah; 
That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at 
the time and place therein named and thereafter 
reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided 
transcription (CAT) under my direction and control; 
I further certify that I have no interest in 
the event of this action. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this the 23rd day of 
March, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM D 
Clayton J. Parr (A3733) 
Dan H. Matthews (5511) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO, 
Petitioner, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
: IVY W. PACHECO 
v. : 
M. ELDON BARNES, Warden : 
Utah State Prison, : Case No. 890904474 HC 
: Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Respondent. : 
Ivy W. Pacheco, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I make the following affidavit on personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am the mother of Petitioner, Robert Paul Pacheco. 
I reside at 1500 West Parkway Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah 84119. 
3. I was present during the trial of Petitioner, Robert 
Paul Pacheco. 
4. I saw Michael Lucero who was a jury member in the 
trial of Petitioner. I have personal knowledge that Michael Lucero 
is related to Petitioner in that he is Petitioner's sister's 
FILED 
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brother-in-law. 
5. I told Petitioner's counsel at trial, Mr. James 
Valdez, that one of the jurors was related to Petitioner. 
Ivy W. Pacheco 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Notary Public 
JOHN R. WOOD 
185 So. State S t #1300 
Salt Lake Chy, Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
January 5,1993 
State of Utah 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
October, 1989. 6. day of 
My Commission Expires: 
/^yf rt 66fa#zr 
rotary Public 
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